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 The constitutional and statutory law blends into a single rule: 
Traffic stops should be the minimum possible intrusion on Oregon 
motorists, and not an excuse to begin questioning, searching or 
investigating that is unrelated to the traffic reason for the stop.1 
INTRODUCTION 
magine that you are driving your car at night in Oregon.  Suddenly, 
you notice a police car following you.  The police car initiates its 
siren and lights and pulls you over.  The officer walks to your car, 
shines a flashlight through your window, and asks for your 
identifying information.  The combination of the officer’s uniform, 
badge, holstered gun, and red-and-blue flashing squad car serve as a 
reminder that this officer possesses tremendous authority over you.  
Upon handing over your driver’s license, registration, and proof of 
insurance, the officer explains the reason for the stop.  Unaware, your 
license plate light had burnt out.2  The officer runs a records check 
and begins questioning you while he awaits the results.  The officer 
asks about your travel destination, whether you have consumed any 
alcohol, and whether there is anything illegal in your car.  You give 
 
1 State v. Carter, 34 Or. App. 21, 32, 578 P.2d 790, 796 (1978). 
2 See OR. REV. STAT. § 816.090(3) (2011) (requiring lights on registration plates). 
I
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truthful, non-incriminating responses to each question.  Not satisfied, 
the officer continues.  “What do you have in the backpack on the 
passenger seat?”  You assure the officer that the backpack only 
contains articles of clothing.  You wonder why the officer continues 
to press on matters that seem to have no relation to your broken 
license plate light.  “May I search the backpack?”, the officer asks.  
“Can I think about that for a second?”, you respond.  There is nothing 
in your interaction with the officer to give him any suspicion of 
criminal activity, yet the officer’s questioning feels intrusive and 
unnecessary.  Meanwhile, the officer receives word from dispatch that 
your records check was uneventful and proceeds to write you a ticket 
for the inoperable light.  As the officer returns to your car and hands 
you the traffic citation, he asks again for consent to search your 
backpack.  The officer’s persistence makes you question the legality 
of the officer’s inquiries. 
Oregon law has not produced a consistent response as to the 
legality of the hypothetical officer’s intrusive questioning of the 
motorist.  In the past, Oregon law restricted law enforcement from 
questioning motorists about matters unrelated to the initial reason for 
the traffic stop unless the officer had a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity afoot.  In other words, Oregon law recognized a 
subject matter limitation to the scope of officer questioning during 
traffic stops.  Support for such a limitation appeared in statutory law 
as well as in federal and state case law.3  The purpose of the subject 
matter limitation was to prevent law enforcement from using routine 
traffic stops to shoehorn broader criminal investigations.4 
However, the enactment in 1997 of ORS 136.432, Oregon’s 
statutory exclusionary rule, created doubt as to the continuing validity 
of a subject matter limitation.  The exclusionary rule spawned a line 
of Oregon cases examining the Oregon Constitution for support of a 
subject matter limitation for traffic stops.  When the Oregon Court of 
Appeals announced its decision in State v. Gomes in 2010, following 
State v. Rodgers, the court did not interpret the Oregon Constitution 
to contain a subject matter limitation.  Nonetheless, current Oregon 
 
3 For examples of Oregon’s statutory support for a subject matter limitation, see infra 
notes 16–17.  For cases concluding that the Oregon Constitution recognizes a subject 
matter limitation, see infra note 12.  For a discussion of Terry v. Ohio, a U.S. Supreme 
Court case that supports a constitutionally recognized subject matter limitation, see infra 
Part V.A.1. 
4 See Carter, 34 Or. App. at 32, 578 P.2d at 796. 
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statutes still prescribe a subject matter limitation to officer conduct 
during traffic stops. 
The apparent contradiction between Oregon statutory law and 
modern Oregon case law regarding a subject matter limitation 
confuses citizens and police officers alike.  On one hand, ORS 
131.615 and ORS 810.410, Oregon’s subject matter limitation 
statutes, clearly restrict the type of questions officers may ask during 
routine traffic stops.5  For citizens, the language of the subject matter 
limitation statutes appears to grant motorists the right to be free from 
baseless, invasive questioning by overreaching police officers.  For 
police officers, the subject matter limitation statutes provide some 
guidance as to the propriety and legality of officer questioning during 
traffic stops.  On the other hand, Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule 
and modern case law do not recognize a subject matter limitation to 
traffic stops.  As a result, evidence obtained in violation of Oregon’s 
subject matter limitation statutes is nonetheless admissible unless it 
offends the U.S. or Oregon Constitutions. 
This Comment will present three possible approaches to addressing 
the disparity between Oregon’s apparent statutory subject matter 
limitation and Oregon case law that rejects such a limitation.  Before 
discussing those approaches, the Comment first reviews Oregon 
search and seizure law.  Next, the Comment examines the origins of a 
subject matter limitation in Oregon and summarizes its historical 
progression in Oregon case and statutory law before the enactment of 
Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule.  The Comment then discusses 
Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule and how its enactment led 
Oregon courts to abandon statutory law as a basis for imposing a 
subject matter limitation and, instead, required courts to analyze 
whether article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution supports such 
a limitation.  The Comment then summarizes recent case law that did 
not interpret the Oregon Constitution as imposing a subject matter 
limitation on traffic stops and explores federal cases concerning 
subject matter limitations and how those cases may have influenced 
recent Oregon case law.  The Comment scrutinizes the rationales 
underlying the Oregon Court of Appeals decisions in Amaya and 
Gomes and examines some of the apparent shortcomings of those 
decisions. 
Finally, through three perspectives, the Comment explores the 
implications of the disparity between current federal and Oregon state 
 
5 See infra notes 16–17. 
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case law and the subject matter limitation statutes.  From one 
perspective, the subject matter limitation statutes were meant to 
remain current law in spite of the disparity between the statutes and 
current case law.  From another perspective, the subject matter 
limitation statutes should be amended to reflect modern federal and 
Oregon state case law.  From a final perspective, the disparity 
between statutory and case law implies that the subject matter 
limitation statutes should be amended to protect motorists from 
intrusive officer questioning. 
I 
AN INTRODUCTION TO OREGON SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW 
Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution protects people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures by government actors.6  
Over time, Oregon case law has fleshed out workable definitions for 
article I, section 9 searches and seizures.  For example, in State v. 
Owens, the Oregon Supreme Court held that an article I, section 9 
“‘search’ occurs when a person’s privacy interests are invaded.”7  
Further, in State v. Ashbaugh, the Oregon Supreme Court articulated 
that 
[a] “seizure” of a person occurs under Article I, section 9, of the 
Oregon Constitution: (a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally 
and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an 
individual of that individual’s liberty or freedom of movement; or 
(b) if a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances 
would believe that (a) above has occurred.8 
Oregon case law acknowledges that a traffic stop constitutes a seizure 
under the Oregon Constitution because it results in a temporary 
 
6 Compare OR. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No law shall violate the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure 
. . . .”) with U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”). 
7 State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 206, 729 P.2d 524, 530 (1986). 
8 State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or. 297, 316, 244 P.3d 360, 370 (2010).  The Ashbaugh 
opinion abrogated the previous test to determine an article I, section 9 seizure from State v. 
Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 409–10, 813 P.2d 28, 34 (1991) (holding that a seizure occurs under 
article I, section 9 whenever a person subjectively believes that a law enforcement officer 
significantly has restricted or interfered with that person’s liberty or freedom of movement 
and such a belief is objectively reasonable under the circumstances).  In Ashbaugh, the 
court did away with the subjective component of the Holmes test. 
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restraint of a person’s liberty.9  The lawfulness of a traffic stop 
depends on the nature of the stop.  If the purpose of the traffic stop is 
a criminal investigation, the stop “must be justified by a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity.”10  On the other hand, if the purpose of 
the traffic stop is to investigate one or more traffic infractions, the 
officer must have probable cause to lawfully execute the stop.11 
II 
HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS TO TRAFFIC STOPS IN OREGON 
The idea that law enforcement can pepper motorists with questions 
about anything may not seem significant.  After all, the hypothetical 
motorist likely only suffered minor anxiety and delay as a result of the 
officer’s intrusive questioning.12  Further, officers have a duty to root 
out crimes and should be able to investigate them as freely as 
possible.  However, Oregon law recognized the need to adopt 
safeguards for traffic stops in order to keep them from being used by 
officers as an excuse to execute full-blown criminal investigations. 
From the 1970s until the late 1990s, Oregon courts recognized 
certain restrictions to officer conduct during routine traffic stops.  For 
one, Oregon case law articulated a temporal restriction to the duration 
of a traffic stop.  The temporal restriction was meant to prevent law 
enforcement from prolonging the duration of a traffic stop beyond the 
time reasonably required to issue a traffic citation.13  Additionally, 
Oregon case law acknowledged a subject matter limitation to the 
scope of officer inquiries during a traffic stop.14  In other words, 
Oregon law restricted law enforcement from asking motorists 
incriminating questions and requesting consent to search for evidence 
of crimes that are unrelated to the reason for the stop.  The subject 
 
9 See, e.g., State v. Matthews, 320 Or. 398, 402 n.1, 884 P.2d 1224, 1226 n.1 (1994) 
(“Stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants is . . . a ‘seizure’ under Article I, section 
9, of the Oregon Constitution.”). 
10 State v. Rodgers, 347 Or. 610, 621, 227 P.3d 695, 702 (2010). 
11 Matthews, 320 Or. at 403, 884 P.2d at 1226. 
12 See supra pp. 2–3. 
13 See State v. Carter, 34 Or. App. 21, 32, 578 P.2d 790, 796 (1978); see also State v. 
Evans, 16 Or. App. 189, 197, 517 P.2d 1225, 1229 (1974) (holding that detention and 
inquiry beyond the time, place, and subject matter limits codified in ORS 131.615 
constitute an invalid random intervention into the liberty and privacy of a person).  As this 
Comment discusses infra Part V, modern Oregon law still recognizes the temporal 
restriction on the duration of traffic stops. 
14 Carter, 34 Or. App. at 32, 578 P.2d at 796; Evans, 16 Or. App. at 197, 517 P.2d at 
1229. 
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matter restriction was meant to prohibit law enforcement conduct that 
strays from the original justification for the traffic stop.15 
Oregon courts relied on statutory law as a basis for imposing both 
the temporal and subject matter limitations on traffic stops.  ORS 
131.615, the investigatory stops statute, imposes both limitations on 
peace officers in subsections (1) through (3).16  Similarly, ORS 
810.410, the powers-to-arrest statute, prohibits peace officers from 
inquiring into matters unrelated to the traffic reason for a stop unless 
there exists an independent, reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.17 
Relying on the subject matter limitation statutes, ORS 131.615 and 
810.410, Oregon courts imposed a subject matter limitation on traffic 
stops for many years until the legislature enacted Oregon’s 
exclusionary rule.  For example, in State v. Carter, the court relied on 
ORS 131.615 in recognizing a subject matter limitation to traffic 
stops.18  The officer in Carter pulled over the defendants for 
 
15 Carter, 34 Or. App. at 32, 578 P.2d at 796. 
16 The statute reads: 
 (1) A peace officer who reasonably suspects that a person has committed or is 
about to commit a crime may stop the person and, after informing the person that 
the peace officer is a peace officer, make a reasonable inquiry. 
 (2) The detention and inquiry shall be conducted in the vicinity of the stop and 
for no longer than a reasonable time. 
 (3) The inquiry shall be considered reasonable if it is limited to: 
(a) The immediate circumstances that aroused the officer’s suspicion; 
(b) Other circumstances arising during the course of the detention and 
inquiry that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and 
(c) Ensuring the safety of the officer, the person stopped or other persons 
present, including an inquiry regarding the presence of weapons. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 131.615(1)-(3) (2011). 
17 “A police officer . . . [m]ay stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for the 
purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic violation, identification, and 
issuance of a citation.”  OR. REV. STAT. § 810.410(3)(b) (2011).  “A police officer . . . 
[m]ay make an inquiry into circumstances arising during the course of a detention and 
investigation under paragraph (b) of this subsection that give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity.”  Id. § 810.410(3)(c). 
18 “Detention and inquiry beyond the time, place and subject-matter limits codified in 
ORS 131.615—all components of what we call ‘intrusiveness’—constitute an invalid 
‘random intervention into the liberty and privacy of a person.’”  Carter, 34 Or. App. at 31, 
578 P.2d at 796 (quoting Evans, 16 Or. App. at 197, 517 P.2d at 1229).  Although Evans 
predates Carter, the Evans decision was not based on ORS 131.615 and 810.410.  Rather, 
Evans was decided against the backdrop of Terry v. Ohio, discussed infra. 
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speeding.19  After obtaining the defendant-driver’s vehicle 
registration and license, the officer ran a records check on the car and 
its occupants.20  Though the records check came back clear, dispatch 
indicated that the car was registered to a maintenance company, not in 
the name of Dawson’s father, as Dawson had implied.21  Having 
aroused the officer’s suspicion, the officer asked to search the 
vehicle22  The defendants consented to the search, which revealed 
large quantities of marijuana.23  Relying on ORS 131.615, the Carter 
court remanded the case for findings on the issue of the officer’s 
intrusiveness.24  The Carter court held that the officer had no 
objectively reasonable suspicion that an illegal substance was present 
in the car before requesting consent to search.25  Of further 
importance to the Carter decision was the court’s view that one of the 
purposes of enacting ORS 131.615 was to codify the constitutional 
limitations to investigatory stops recognized in Terry v. Ohio.26 
In State v. Foster, the court relied on ORS 810.410 in holding for 
the suppression of evidence obtained through police inquiries that 
were unrelated to the traffic infraction.27  The officer in Foster pulled 
over a car for not having a working rear license plate light.28  The 
officer then arrested the defendant-driver after learning that he had an 
outstanding warrant.29  After the arrest, the officer then asked and 
 
19 Carter, 34 Or. App. at 23, 578 P.2d at 792.  Before executing the traffic stop, the 
officer was informed that some juveniles were suspects in recent burglaries and that they 
might be camped near a utility installation.  Id.  After observing defendants pick up a 
hitchhiker near a utility station, the officer began following defendants because of the 
reported burglaries.  Id.  The officer then pulled over defendants after pacing their speed 
over the legal limit.  Id. 
20 Id. at 23–24, 578 P.2d at 792. 
21 Id. at 24, 578 P.2d at 792–93.  Although the car was not technically registered to 
Dawson’s father, the court noted that “it seems obvious that [the officer] would have 
known who the registered owner was as soon as he saw the vehicle registration, which was 
before he ran the ‘records check.’” Id. at 24, 578 P.2d at 793. 
22 Id. at 25, 578 P.2d at 793.  Here, the court noted that the trial record lacked any 
explanation as to why the officer thought that his request to search the car would clear up 
his concern about the registered owner of the vehicle.  Id. at 25 n.2. 
23 Id. at 24, 578 P.2d at 792. 
24 Id. at 31, 33, 578 P.2d at 796–97. 
25 Id. at 33, 578 P.2d at 797. 
26 Id. at 31, 578 P.2d at 796; see also State v. Warner, 284 Or. 147, 164, 585 P.2d 681, 
690 (1978) (recognizing that ORS 131.615 is “an attempted restatement of the rule of 
Terry v. Ohio”). 
27 State v. Foster, 139 Or. App. 303, 306–07, 912 P.2d 377, 378 (1996). 
28 Id. at 305, 912 P.2d at 377. 
29 Id. 
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obtained consent from the defendant-passenger to search the car, 
which resulted in the finding of an illegal narcotic.30  In holding for 
the suppression of evidence, the court in Foster reasoned that the 
officer lacked the authority under ORS 810.410 to detain and question 
the defendant-passenger further after the arrest of the driver was 
complete.  The court disagreed with the State’s interpretation of ORS 
810.410(3)31 and concluded that the officer needed some basis other 
than the traffic infraction to detain and question the defendant.32 
III 
THE ENACTMENT OF ORS 136.432: OREGON’S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
In 1997, the Oregon Legislature introduced ORS 136.432,33 
Oregon’s version of the federal exclusionary rule,34 as section 1 of 
Senate Bill 936.  The intended effect of the bill was to prevent courts 
from suppressing evidence except when required by the federal or 
 
30 Id. at 305, 912 P.2d at 377–78. 
31 The State argued that ORS 810.410(3) does not limit officer actions once an officer 
develops probable cause to arrest a suspect.  Thus, according to the State’s argument, the 
defendant’s consent to search in Foster was valid because the officer’s knowledge of the 
driver’s prior drug conviction gave the officer an independent basis for requesting the 
search.  Id. at 306, 912 P.2d at 378.  The court disagreed, responding that once an 
investigation of a traffic infraction has ended, an officer’s authority to detain and question 
a defendant-passenger dissipates if there is no other basis to enlarge the scope of the 
investigation.  Id. 
32 Id. at 307, 912 P.2d at 378. 
33 ORS 136.432 reads: 
 A court may not exclude relevant and otherwise admissible evidence in a 
criminal action on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of any statutory 
provision unless exclusion of the evidence is required by: 
 (1) The United States Constitution or the Oregon Constitution; 
 (2) The rules of evidence governing privileges and the admission of hearsay; or 
 (3) The rights of the press. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 136.432 (2011). 
34 Although the U.S. Constitution itself “contains no provision expressly precluding the 
use of evidence obtained in violation of its commands,” the federal exclusionary rule 
emerged from the Fourth Amendment and its interpretation through federal case law.  
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 
(1961) (concluding that the exclusionary rule applies to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment: “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the 
Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court”); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (holding that in a federal prosecution the Fourth 
Amendment bars the use of evidence obtained through an unconstitutional search and 
seizure). 
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state constitutions.35  However, critics of the bill claimed that the law 
was really meant to repeal the rules of evidence and render all 
relevant evidence admissible.36  In response to that criticism, one of 
the drafters of the bill clarified that the proposed law “only applies to 
relevant evidence ‘obtained’ in violation of statute, not relevant 
evidence . . . made inadmissible by statute.”37 
In effect, Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule does not supersede 
statutes that explicitly call for evidence suppression as a remedy to its 
violation.  However, the exclusionary rule emasculates statutes such 
as ORS 131.615 and ORS 810.410, the subject matter limitations, that 
do not expressly require evidence suppression as a statutory remedy.  
That is because the subject matter limitation statutes essentially grant 
rights to citizens without providing a statutory remedy for their 
violation.  Because those statutes do not expressly call for evidence 
suppression as a remedy, Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule allows 
the admission of evidence obtained in violation of those statutes. 
To help illustrate the effect of Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule 
on the subject matter limitation statutes, contrast the investigatory 
stops statute38 with ORS 165.540.39  The statutory language of the 
investigatory stops statute does not expressly prescribe evidence 
suppression as a remedy for its violation.  As a result, Oregon’s 
statutory exclusionary rule precludes suppression of any evidence 
obtained in violation of ORS 131.615 unless the violation offends the 
U.S. or Oregon Constitutions.  To the contrary, ORS 165.540 grants a 
right, as well as a clear remedy––evidence suppression––if that right 
 
35 Audio Tape, Public Hearing on S.B. 936A Held by the Comm. on Judiciary, 
Subcomm. on Criminal Law, 59th Or. Legis. Assemb. (Apr. 17, 1997) (on file with Oregon 
State Archives) (statement of Norm Frink). 
36 State v. Thompson-Seed, 162 Or. App. 483, 489, 986 P.2d 732, 735 (1999). 
37 Id. (quoting Public Hearing on S.B. 936A, supra note 35 (statement of Mark Gardner) 
(emphasis added)).  However, the court in Thompson-Seed goes on to add that Gardner’s 
testimony at the House Subcommittee hearing was not entirely consistent.  The court 
observed, “At another stage in the hearings . . . Gardner testified that [section 136.432] 
would indeed have the effect of repealing other statutory rules of exclusion.  He 
commented that the legislature could deter violations of statutes by attaching civil or 
criminal liability as a consequence of a violation without affecting the admissibility of the 
evidence.”  Id. at 490, 986 P.2d at 735. 
38 See supra note 15. 
39 OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540 (2011) (requiring, in part, that police officers inform 
individuals when they are being recorded by audio or video equipment if there is a 
reasonable opportunity to inform). 
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is infringed.40  Thus, Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule effectively 
prevents judges from determining the admissibility of evidence 
obtained in violation of statutes that do not prescribe suppression as a 
remedy.  However, when statutes expressly require evidence 
suppression as a remedy, Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule does 
not factor into the determination of admissibility. 
In sum, as a result of Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule, courts 
could no longer suppress evidence obtained in violation of the subject 
matter limitation statutes unless the federal or state constitution 
required its exclusion.  The Oregon Legislature hoped to prevent 
courts from creating new rules on the admissibility of evidence.  
However, Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule was not intended to 
supersede preexisting statutes that expressly call for evidence 
suppression as a remedy. 
IV 
DOES THE OREGON CONSTITUTION RECOGNIZE A SUBJECT MATTER 
LIMITATION? 
Before ORS 136.432, Oregon courts had not considered the 
Oregon Constitution as a basis for a subject matter limitation because 
the courts found that support in the subject matter limitation statutes.  
However, the enactment of ORS 136.432 meant that evidence 
obtained in violation of the subject matter limitation statutes would 
not be admissible unless the questioning officer violated the state or 
federal constitutions.  Thus, the question whether Oregon law 
recognizes a subject matter limitation to investigatory stops shifted 
from a statutory to a constitutional analysis.  As this Comment 
summarizes below, a recent line of Oregon cases concludes that the 
Oregon Constitution does not require a subject matter limitation to 
traffic stops. 
A.  State v. Amaya 
The Amaya court held that law enforcement could inquire into 
matters unrelated to a valid traffic stop so long as the inquiry occurred 
 
40 The remedy is actually expressed in a separate statute, ORS 41.910, which was 
enacted before ORS 136.432.  OR. REV. STAT. § 41.910 (2011) (prescribing evidence 
suppression if obtained in violation of ORS 165.540). 
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during the stop.41  In other words, only if the law enforcement 
conduct unreasonably prolongs the temporal duration of the stop, will 
the questioning violate the state and federal constitutions.42 
1.  The Amaya Court’s State Constitutional Analysis 
In Amaya, the court of appeals examined prior Oregon case law to 
determine whether the Oregon Constitution requires a subject matter 
limitation on officer inquiries during routine traffic stops.  The Amaya 
court’s state constitutional analysis essentially revisited State v. 
Evans,43 State v. Carter,44 and State v. Toevs.45  Before concluding 
that these prior cases did not interpret article I, section 9 as imposing 
a subject matter limitation, the Amaya court articulated its reasons for 
rejecting the applicability of those cases to the question of a 
constitutionally recognized subject matter limitation. 
The Amaya court first attacked the defendant’s reliance on State v. 
Evans and State v. Carter as sources of support for a subject matter 
limitation under the Oregon Constitution.  Specifically, the Amaya 
court disagreed with defendant’s reliance on Evans because the Evans 
holding was premised on federal constitutional law under Terry v. 
Ohio.46  Further, the Amaya court also considered the Evans 
holding47 to be inapplicable to traffic stops because Evans involved a 
 
41 State v. Amaya, 176 Or. App. 35, 44, 29 P.3d 1177, 1181 (2001).  In Amaya, the 
officer pulled over a van after observing it stopped in the middle of the road with a burned-
out license plate light.  Id. at 37, 29 P.3d at 1178.  The officer noticed the defendant-
passenger tucking something into a purse at her feet as he approached the van.  Id.  During 
the traffic stop, the officer learned that the driver did not have a valid license.  Id.  Fearing 
that the defendant-passenger could be armed based on her observed behavior, the officer 
requested, and received consent, to search of the van.  Id. at 37–38, 29 P.3d at 1178.  
However, the officer did not initiate the search until a second officer arrived to assist.  Id. 
at 37, 29 P.3d at 1178.  While awaiting the second officer’s arrival, the officer started 
asking defendant about her purse and whether he could search it in addition to the van.  Id.  
Defendant eventually admitted that she had a pistol in her bag, which was recovered in the 
subsequent search.  Id. 
42 Id. at 43–47, 29 P.3d at 1181–83. 
43 16 Or. App. 189, 517 P.2d 1225 (1974).  See supra note 19 for a brief discussion of 
the Evans case. 
44 34 Or. App. 21, 578 P.2d 790 (1978).  For a discussion of Carter, see supra Part II.A. 
45 327 Or. 522, 964 P.2d 1007 (1998). 
46 Amaya, 176 Or. App. at 41–42, 29 P.3d at 1180. 
47 Essentially, the Evans holding restates part of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in 
Terry v. Ohio: “the police may seize or search a person with such a degree of intensity as 
may be justified by the articulable quantum of knowledge they have and by the gravity of 
the police purpose to be served.”  Evans, 16 Or. App. at 194, 517 P.2d at 1228. 
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street encounter, whereas Amaya and Terry involved traffic stops.48  
The factual distinction was important to the Amaya court because the 
Evans opinion represented a source of state constitutional support for 
the bright-line rule from Carter: “the scope of an officer’s authority to 
question a person in the context of a traffic stop is limited by a 
reasonable suspicion requirement.”49  Thus, because Evans was 
premised on federal constitutional law involving street encounters, the 
Amaya court concluded that Evans was inapplicable to an analysis of 
a subject matter limitation to traffic stops under the Oregon 
Constitution.50  Moreover, because Evans formed the basis for the 
Carter holding,51 the Amaya court concluded that Carter erroneously 
read a subject matter limitation into article I, section 9. 
Second, the Amaya court cited State v. Toevs to support its view 
that officer questioning during a traffic stop does not have to be 
supported with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity unless it 
detains a defendant beyond a completed traffic stop.  The Amaya 
court interpreted Toevs to mean that officer questioning during a 
traffic stop does not itself represent a seizure distinct from the traffic 
stop under article I, section 9 unless it has the “effect of 
accomplishing a restraint on liberty.”52  Because officer questioning 
itself does not amount to a seizure, article I, section 9 is not 
implicated.53  Further, because officer questioning itself does not 
trigger article I, section 9, law enforcement does not require 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before inquiring into subject 
matter unrelated to the traffic reason for the stop.54 
Applying its interpretations of Evans, Carter, and Toevs to the 
facts of the case, the Amaya court reasoned that the officer’s 
questioning did not amount to a seizure because it did not have a 
 
48 Amaya, 176 Or. App. at 41–42, 29 P.3d at 1180 (“Clearly, Evans had nothing to do 
with the scope of a police inquiry during a traffic stop. . . . [Evans’ holding] offers no 
support for the bright-line rule spelled out in [Carter] that the scope of an officer’s 
authority to question a person in the context of a traffic stop is limited by a reasonable 
suspicion requirement.”). 
49 Id. (summarizing the rule spelled out in Carter). 
50 Id. 
51 Carter, 34 Or. App. at 32, 578 P.2d at 796 (holding that the scope of an officer’s 
authority to question a person in the context of a traffic stop is limited by a reasonable 
suspicion requirement). 
52 Amaya, 176 Or. App. at 43, 29 P.3d at 1181 (citing State v. Toevs, 327 Or. 525, 964 
P.2d 1007 (1998)). 
53 Id. at 44, 29 P.3d at 1181. 
54 Id. 
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detaining effect on the defendant beyond the completed traffic stop.55  
According to the Amaya court, the defendant was “entirely free to 
leave” when the officer was asking questions while awaiting the 
arrival of a second officer.56  Moreover, the Amaya court considered 
the wait time for the arrival of the second officer as part of the 
ongoing traffic stop.  Thus, because the officer’s questioning occurred 
during the wait time, the questioning took place during the traffic stop 
and therefore did not prolong the temporal duration of the stop.57 
2.  The Amaya Court’s Federal Constitutional Analysis 
Next, the Amaya court examined federal constitutional case law as 
part of its analysis of a constitutionally prescribed subject matter 
limitation.  First, the court asserted that it was “free to adopt whatever 
view of the federal constitution that [it] find[s] most persuasive” in 
the absence of U.S. Supreme Court precedent.58  Apparently, the 
Amaya court was unaware of any binding U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent that inferred a subject matter limitation from the federal 
Constitution.  Second, at the time of the Amaya decision, federal 
circuits were split as to whether police inquiries during the course of a 
lawful traffic stop amounted to a Fourth Amendment search or 
seizure.59  According to some federal circuits, officer questioning 
during a traffic stop did not implicate Fourth Amendment protections 
because the questioning itself did not amount to a search or seizure 
under the federal Constitution.60  As a result, these circuits concluded 
that such questioning is permissible even without a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, so long as the questioning itself does 
not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop.  On the other hand, some 
federal circuits concluded that officer questioning alone does amount 
to a Fourth Amendment search or seizure, and therefore law 
enforcement may not question a traffic stop detainee over matters 
 
55 Id. at 44, 29 P.2d at 1182. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 46–47, 29 P.2d at 1183 (citing Joyce v. Multnomah Cnty., 114 Or. App. 244, 
248, 835 P.2d 127, 129 (1992)). 
59 Id. at 45, 29 P.3d at 1182. 
60 See, e.g., infra note 61 (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s position that questioning, by 
itself, during a lawful traffic stop does not amount to a constitutional search or seizure). 
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unrelated to the purpose of the stop unless the officer has reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity.61 
The Amaya court considered the opposing viewpoints of the Fifth 
and Tenth Circuits in its determination as to whether federal law 
recognized a subject matter limitation to traffic stops.  On one hand, 
the Fifth Circuit, as illustrated in United States v. Shabazz,62 did not 
view the Fourth Amendment as imposing a subject matter limitation 
to the scope of a traffic stop.63  The Shabazz court reasoned that 
because the officers’ questioning occurred during a records check of 
the defendants, the questioning did not extend the duration of the 
valid seizure and was therefore lawful.64  On the other hand, the 
Tenth Circuit, under United States v. Holt, held that “an officer 
conducting a routine traffic stop may not ask the detainee questions 
unrelated to the purpose of the stop, even if the questioning does not 
extend the normal length of the stop, unless the officer has reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity.”65 
Ultimately, the Amaya court sided with the Fifth Circuit.66  The 
Fifth Circuit’s reasoning persuaded the court, in light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s holding in Florida v. Bostick, that officer 
questioning, by itself, does not equate to a Fourth Amendment search 
or seizure.67  The Amaya court went on to attack the Tenth Circuit’s 
position68 before reaching its holding that “questioning during the 
 
61 See, e.g., infra note 64 (discussing the Tenth Circuit’s position that law enforcement 
may not ask questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop unless the officer has reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity). 
62 993 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1993).  In Shabazz, officers ran a computer check on the 
identifications of defendants after pulling them over for speeding.  Id. at 433.  During the 
computer check, the officers questioned the defendants, which produced incriminating 
information.  Id.  The defendants unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence obtained 
during the computer check, arguing that the questioning was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion of any criminal activity.  Id. at 435–38. 
63 Id. at 436 (rejecting “any notion that a police officer’s questioning, even on a subject 
unrelated to the purpose of the stop, is itself a Fourth Amendment violation”). 
64 Id. at 437. 
65 United States v. Holt, 229 F.3d 931, 936 (10th Cir. 2000).  The Holt court based its 
decision on “prior Tenth Circuit decisions [that] compelled adherence to the rule that 
police may not engage in questioning unrelated to the purpose of the stop without 
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.”  United States v. Amaya, 176 Or. App. 35, 46, 29 
P.3d 1177, 1183 (2001) (citing Holt, 229 F.3d at 936–37). 
66 Amaya, 176 Or. App. at 47, 29 P.3d at 1183. 
67 Id. (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)). 
68 See id. (criticizing the court in United States v. Holt for failing to explain “why mere 
questioning during the course of a lawful traffic stop rises to the level of a search or a 
seizure”). 
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course of a traffic stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment unless 
it has the effect of further detaining the defendant without reasonable 
suspicion of illegal activity.”69 
B.  State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby 
After the court of appeals’ decision in Amaya, the Oregon Supreme 
Court decided State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, a consolidation of two cases 
from the court of appeals.70  In State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby, the Oregon 
Supreme Court framed and analyzed the key question: does article I, 
section 9 of the Oregon Constitution impose a subject matter 
limitation on traffic stops? 
In Rodgers/Kirkeby, both defendants argued that the evidence 
discovered during the respective searches of their vehicles were 
products of unconstitutional seizures under article I, section 9 of the 
Oregon Constitution.71  In response, the State asserted that law 
enforcement could engage in mere conversation during a lawful 
traffic stop to inquire into unrelated matters, so long as the 
questioning did not unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop.72  
According to the State, such inquiries were of the same type held to 
be permissible in officer–citizen street encounters, and therefore did 
 
69 Id. 
70 State v. Rodgers (Rodgers II), 347 Or. 610, 227 P.3d 695 (2010) (consolidating State 
v. Rodgers (Rodgers I), 219 Or. App. 366, 182 P.3d 209 (2008) and State v. Kirkeby, 220 
Or. App. 177, 185 P.3d 510 (2008) for purposes of opinion).  In Rodgers I, the officer 
pulled the defendant over for driving with a burned-out license plate light.  Rodgers I, 219 
Or. App. at 368, 182 P.3d at 211.  The officer developed suspicion of methamphetamine 
possession after observing sores on the defendant’s face and two odd containers in the 
defendant’s car.  Id.  While the officer waited for the results of a records check of 
defendant, a second officer arrived to assist.  Id.  After the records check came back clear, 
the two officers questioned the defendant about the contents of the odd containers.  Id. at 
368–69, 182 P.3d at 212.  The officers eventually obtained consent to search the vehicle 
and, during the search, the officers recovered numerous precursor materials for 
manufacturing methamphetamine.  Id. at 369, 182 P.3d at 212.  In Kirkeby, the officer 
observed the defendant, whom the officer knew to have a suspended license, driving a car.  
Kirkeby, 220 Or. App. at 179, 185 P.3d at 511.  After the officer stopped the car, the 
defendant was unable to present the officer with a valid driver’s license.  Id. at 180, 185 
P.3d at 512.  Instead of issuing a citation, the officer asked the defendant about weapons, 
which the defendant denied having.  Id.  The officer also asked for consent to pat down the 
defendant for weapons, which the defendant gave.  Id.  Although the pat down did not 
reveal any weapons, the officer nonetheless asked, and received consent, to examine the 
contents of defendant’s pockets.  Id.  The search revealed methamphetamine, and the 
defendant was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance.  Id. at 181, 
185 P.3d at 512. 
71 Rodgers II, 347 Or. at 614–16, 227 P.3d at 698–99. 
72 Id. at 618, 227 P.3d at 700. 
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not implicate article I, section 9.73  The defense responded by 
distinguishing mere conversation in officer–citizen street encounters 
from mere conversation during traffic stops.74  During a mere street 
encounter with police, the defense argued, a person’s conversation 
with an officer does not amount to a seizure because the person can 
end the encounter and walk away at any time.75  Conversely, during a 
traffic stop, a driver is obligated to remain and interact with the 
officer.76  In other words, “the traffic stop itself is a seizure for 
constitutional purposes.”77  Thus, the defendants argued, article I, 
section 9 limits officers to “investigatory questions about the vehicle 
code violation for which a driver is stopped, unless the officer 
develops reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that 
[criminal activity is afoot].”78 
In holding for the suppression of evidence for both defendants, the 
court adopted the defendants’ arguments in multiple respects.  First, 
the court agreed with the defendants’ differentiation between street 
and traffic stop encounters with law enforcement: “in contrast to a 
person on the street, who may unilaterally end an officer–citizen 
encounter at any time, the reality is that a motorist stopped for a 
traffic infraction is legally obligated to stop at an officer’s 
direction.”79  Second, the court agreed with the defendants that article 
I, section 9 provides both temporal and subject matter limitations to 
law enforcement conduct during traffic stops: “[p]olice conduct 
during a noncriminal traffic stop does not further implicate Article I, 
 
73 Id. at 617, 227 P.3d at 700 (citing State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 410, 813 P.2d 28, 34 
(1991)).  The Court in Holmes observed that “police–motorist encounters, like pedestrian 
encounters, are not per se ‘seizures.’”  Holmes, 311 Or. at 409–11, 813 P.2d at 34.  The 
court explained, “[L]aw enforcement officers may approach persons on the street or in 
public places, question them, and even accompany them to another location without the 
encounter necessarily constituting a ‘seizure’ of a person under Article I, section 9.”  Id. at 
409, 813 P.2d at 34.  According to the Holmes test, a “seizure” under the Oregon 
Constitution occurs only when law enforcement “(a) . . . intentionally and significantly 
restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual’s liberty or 
freedom or movement; or (b) whenever an individual believes that (a), above, has occurred 
and such belief is objectively reasonable in the circumstances.”  Id.  But see State v. 
Ashbaugh, 349 Or. 297, 244 P.3d 360 (2010) (abrogating the Holmes test for a seizure 
under article I, section 9). 





79 Id. at 622–23, 227 P.3d at 702. 
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section 9, so long as the detention is limited and the police conduct is 
reasonably related to the investigation of the noncriminal traffic 
violation.”80  The court agreed with some of the state’s arguments, 
notably the contention that police inquiries during a traffic stop in and 
of themselves do not require any justification because they are neither 
searches nor seizures.81  However, the court ultimately held that 
“police inquiries unrelated to a traffic violation, when combined with 
physical restraint or a police show of authority, may result in a 
restriction of personal freedom that violates article 1, section 9.”82  
Because both defendants successfully proved that the officers’ 
conduct constituted showings of authority that limited the defendants’ 
freedom of movement,83 the Rodgers II court concluded that the 
officers’ unrelated questioning resulted in an unlawful seizure under 
article I, section 9. 84 
C.  State v. Gomes 
In 2010, the Oregon Court of Appeals decided State v. Gomes.85  
The Gomes decision is integral to the discussion of a constitutional, 
 
80 Id. at 624, 227 P.3d at 703. 
81 In Rodgers II, the State relied on State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 813 P.3d 28 (1991).  
The court in Holmes observed that police encounters with motorists, like those with 
pedestrians, are not per se seizures: “law enforcement officers may approach persons on 
the street or in public places, question them, and even accompany them to another location 
without the encounter necessarily constituting a ‘seizure’ of a person under Article 1, 
section 9.”  Holmes, 311 Or. at 409–11, 813 P.3d at 34.  This was because, according to 
the Holmes test, a “seizure” under the Oregon Constitution only occurred when law 
enforcement “(a) . . . intentionally and significantly restricts, interferes with, or otherwise 
deprives an individual of that individual’s liberty or freedom of movement; or (b) 
whenever an individual believes that (a), above, has occurred and such belief is objectively 
reasonable in the circumstances.”  Id. at 409, 813 P.3d at 34. 
82 Rodgers II, 347 Or. at 624, 227 P.3d at 703. 
83 The Rodgers II court found that the officers involved in both Rodgers’s and 
Kirkeby’s respective stops demonstrated a sufficient showing of authority and physical 
restraint while posing their inquiries.  In Rodgers’s circumstance, the Rodgers II court 
concluded that the officer’s position at the driver’s side window and the second officer’s 
presence on the passenger’s side of the car “was a sufficient ‘show of authority’ that, in 
combination with the unrelated questions concerning the items in the car and the request to 
search the car, resulted in a significant restriction of defendant’s freedom of movement.”  
Id. at 627, 227 P.3d at 705.  As for Kirkeby, the Rodgers II court concluded that “the 
deputy’s show of authority that accompanied his request that defendant consent to a 
patdown and subsequent request that defendant consent to an examination of the contents 
of defendant’s pockets occurred after the point that defendant should have been issued a 
citation and sent on his way.”  Id. at 628, 227 P.3d at 705. 
84 Id. 
85 236 Or. App. 364, 236 P.3d 841 (2010). 
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subject matter limitation because it presented the first opportunity for 
the Oregon Court of Appeals to apply the holding from Rodgers II.  
As this Comment explores below, the Gomes decision represents a 
clear message from the Oregon Court of Appeals that the Oregon 
Constitution does not impose a subject matter limitation to officer 
questioning during traffic stops. 
In Gomes, the police pulled over a driver for speeding and failing 
to signal during a lane change.86  As the officer approached the 
driver’s side window, he observed in plain view a butane cigarette 
lighter and an empty cigarette pack.87  While the driver was retrieving 
his identification documents, the officer asked to see the cigarette 
pack, in which he found a pill of Cialis.88  At this point, the officer 
asked for consent to search the car, explaining to both the driver and 
defendant-passenger that the desire to search the car arose in response 
to concern about the Cialis.89  After the driver gave his consent to 
search the car, the officer also asked defendant-passenger if he could 
search her purse, and she initially declined.90  The defendant 
eventually consented to a search of her purse after the officer asked 
her a series of questions, one of which elicited the admission that 
there were drugs in her purse.91  The officer found cocaine, the 
disputed evidence, in the purse.92 
The court in Gomes ultimately held that the officer’s inquiries, 
though unrelated to the reason for the stop and not supported by a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, did not implicate article I, 
section 9 because the questioning did not unreasonably prolong the 
 
86 Gomes, 236 Or. App. at 366, 236 P.3d at 842. 
87 Id.  The officer later testified at trial that, based on his training and experience, the 
lighter and cigarette pack led to his suspicion that illegal drugs were also in the car.  Id. 
88 Id. at 366–67, 236 P.3d at 842.  The pill was identified as Cialis.  After the defendant 
admitted that a friend gave him the pill, the officer found probable cause to find that the 
driver violated ORS 689.765(6): “No person shall sell, give away, barter, dispense, 
distribute, buy, receive or possess any prescription drug except as authorized by law.”  Id. 
at 367, 236 P.3d at 842. 
89 Id. at 367, 236 P.3d at 842.  At first, the driver did not consent to a search of his car.  
Id.  However, after the officer threatened to impound the car until he could obtain a search 
warrant, the driver eventually consented to a search.  Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 368, 236 P.3d at 843.  At this point in the traffic stop, the officer’s questioning 
of defendant occurred when defendant was handcuffed and after she had been read her 
Miranda rights.  Id. 
92 Id. 
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duration of the traffic stop.93  The Gomes court’s holding was based 
in large part on its interpretation that Rodgers II meant that the 
Oregon Constitution only imposes a temporal limitation on officer 
inquiries during a traffic stop.94  In the eyes of the Gomes court, 
because the questioning occurred during the time that the officer was 
lawfully conducting the traffic stop, the questioning did not result in 
an unlawful extension of the stop.95 
V 
CRITIQUING THE UNDERLYING RATIONALES TO THE AMAYA AND 
GOMES OPINIONS 
In State v. Amaya, the Oregon Court of Appeals rejected its 
statutory reasoning from prior decades to hold that, under article I, 
section 9, police may inquire into matters that are unrelated to the 
traffic stop, so long as the inquiry occurs during the traffic stop and 
does not prolong the temporal duration of the stop.  Although the 
Amaya court held that officer questioning does not per se result in a 
constitutional seizure, the court noted that some officer questioning 
might rise to the level of a seizure based on the circumstances.96  
Subsequently, in Rodgers II, the Oregon Supreme Court held that 
“police inquiries unrelated to a traffic violation, when combined with 
physical restraint or a police show of authority, may result in a 
restriction of personal freedom that violates article I, section 9.”97  
However, the Rodgers II opinion sent mixed signals about the 
existence of a subject matter limitation. 
On one hand, the Rodgers II court stated that “[p]olice conduct 
during a noncriminal traffic stop does not further implicate article I, 
section 9, so long as the detention is limited and the police conduct is 
reasonably related to the investigation of the noncriminal traffic 
violation.”98  On the other hand, the Rodgers II court left open to 
interpretation the question of a subject matter limitation: “[w]e 
express no opinion about the effect of unrelated police inquiries that 
 
93 Id. at 371, 236 P.3d at 845. 
94 Id.  “We take the language to confirm our Rodgers [II] opinion and our opinion in 
State v. Amaya, 176 Or.[]App. 35, 29 P.3d 1177 (2001) . . . that there are no Article 1, 
section 9, implications if an inquiry unrelated to the traffic stop occurs during a routine 
stop but does not delay it.”  Id. 
95 Id. at 372, 236 P.3d at 845. 
96 Amaya, 176 Or. at 44, 29 P.3d at 1181. 
97 State v. Rodgers (Rodgers II), 347 Or. 610, 624, 227 P.3d 695, 703 (2010). 
98 Id. (emphasis added). 
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occur during the course of the traffic violation investigation and that 
do not result in any further restriction of movement of the 
individual.”99  Finally, in Gomes, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
divined the following rule from the Rodgers II opinion: “[w]e take the 
language [from Rodgers II] to confirm our . . . opinion in State v. 
Amaya . . . that there are no article I, section 9, implications if an 
inquiry unrelated to the traffic stop occurs during a routine stop but 
does not delay it.”100 
Based on its decisions in Amaya and Gomes, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals does not recognize the Oregon Constitution to impose a 
subject matter limitation on a lawful stop.  However, was the 
limitation in Gomes and Amaya a correct interpretation of preexisting 
state and federal case law?  Below, this Comment first dissects the 
Amaya opinion in order to fully understand how the court came to its 
conclusion concerning a subject matter limitation.  Second, this 
Comment scrutinizes the Gomes opinion in order to better 
comprehend the court’s interpretation of prior state case law, 
including the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Rodgers II. 
A.  Understanding the Amaya Decision in Light of Preexisting State 
and Federal Case Law 
As a result of the Amaya decision, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
rejected its statutory reasoning from prior decades to hold that, as a 
matter of constitutional law, police may inquire into matters that are 
unrelated to the stop, so long as the inquiry occurs during the traffic 
stop.  The Amaya court claimed that its decision was made in a 
vacuum because of a purported lack of binding state and federal 
precedent.101  However, the Amaya court was constrained by prior 
case law. 
 
99 Id. at 627 n.5, 227 P.3d at 705 n.5. 
100 Gomes, 236 Or. App. at 371, 236 P.3d at 845.  Here, the Gomes court was referring 
to the following language from Rodgers II: 
‘Because police inquiries during a traffic stop are neither searches nor seizures, 
[such] police inquiries in and of themselves require no justification and do not 
necessarily implicate Article I, section 9’ unless ‘combined with physical 
restraint or a police show of authority,’ in which case they ‘may result in a 
restriction of personal freedom that violates Article I, section 9.’ 
Id. (alteration in original) (citing Rodgers II, 347 Or. at 623–24, 227 P.3d at 702–03). 
101 “In no case . . . have we held that the federal or state constitution precludes an 
officer from questioning a defendant during a traffic stop in the absence of reasonable 
suspicion.”  State v. Amaya, 176 Or. App. 35, 42, 29 P.3d 1177, 1180–81 (2001). 
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1.  Revisiting the Amaya Court’s Consideration of State v. Evans 
The Amaya court was incorrect to ignore Evans in its constitutional 
analysis of a subject matter limitation.  After all, the Evans holding 
was meant to replicate the holding from Terry v. Ohio, a case that 
dealt with the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and its 
limitations on the scope of police conduct during investigatory 
stops.102  Moreover, the Terry holding is pertinent in the traffic stop 
context because traffic stops are analogous to Terry stops.103  So, 
contrary to the assertion of the Amaya court,104 the Evans opinion had 
at least something to do with the scope of police inquiries during 
traffic stops, because the Terry stop in Evans is analogous to traffic 
stops.105  Further, because Terry stops are analogous to traffic stops, 
the temporal and scope limitations articulated in Terry106 would 
therefore equally apply to traffic stops as they do to other 
investigative stops.107  Therefore, in rejecting the applicability of 
Evans to the court’s state constitutional analysis, the Amaya court 
wrongfully ignored the guiding precedent of Evans. 
2.  Revisiting the Amaya Court’s Treatment of Carter 
Even if the Amaya court was correct to exclude Evans from its 
state constitutional analysis, its rejection of Evans does not necessitate 
a rejection of Carter as a source of constitutional support for a subject 
matter limitation.  Without Evans, the Carter holding survives solely 
 
102 Terry can be read as having multiple holdings.  The holding referred to here is the 
two-pronged test to determine whether an investigative stop satisfied constitutional 
protections under the Fourth Amendment.  Under that test’s first prong, the traffic stop 
must be reasonable in its inception.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20.  The key inquiry to this 
prong is whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the 
search “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was 
appropriate?”  Id. at 21–22 (internal quotations omitted).  Second, the search or seizure 
must be narrowly tailored to the scope of the original reason for the stop.  Id. at 20. 
103 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984). 
104 “Clearly, Evans had nothing to do with the scope of a police inquiry during a traffic 
stop.”  Amaya, 176 Or. App. at 42, 29 P.3d at 1180. 
105 See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439. 
106 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20 (holding that the stop must be related in scope and 
intensity to original justification for stop). 
107 See Wayne LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too Much 
“Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1862 (2004) (noting 
that, because Berkemer supports the characterization of a traffic stop as a Terry stop, the 
temporal and subject matter limitations imposed by Terry “would lead one to believe that 
[those] limitations . . . would apply with equal force to the so-called ‘routine traffic 
stop’”). 
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on its application of ORS 131.615.108  However, even without Evans, 
the basis for the holding in Carter still implicates constitutional 
considerations in light of the legislative purpose behind ORS 131.615, 
which was “to protect interests of the kinds which are protected by the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Art[icle] 
I, s[ection] 9, of the Oregon Constitution.”109  Thus, the Amaya 
court’s characterization of Carter as not being a source of state 
constitutional support for a subject matter limitation is inaccurate. 
Moreover, the law permits officers to execute traffic stops for the 
administrative, noncriminal purpose of enforcing the vehicle code.  
However, the purpose of a criminal stop is to investigate the 
commission of a crime.110  Recognizing that the bases for routine 
traffic stops and criminal stops are different, Carter intended to draw 
a clear line between the justification required for a routine traffic stop 
and that for a criminal investigatory stop by applying a reasonable 
suspicion requirement to lawful criminal stops.  By drawing that line, 
the Carter court clarified the basis for its belief that “traffic stops 
should be the minimum possible intrusion on Oregon motorists, and 
not an excuse to begin questioning, searching or investigating that is 
unrelated to the traffic reason for the stop.”111  The Carter court 
adhered to that belief in order to prevent routine traffic stops from 
becoming wholesale criminal investigations.  However, after the 
Amaya decision, law enforcement can now shoehorn a full-blown 
criminal investigation into a routine traffic stop without any 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity so long as the questioning 
does not prolong the duration of the routine traffic stop.  The Amaya 
 
108 See supra note 17. 
109 State v. Valdez, 277 Or. 621, 629, 561 P.2d 1006, 1011 (1977); see also State v. 
Toevs, 327 Or. 525, 534, 964 P.2d 1007, 1013 (1998) (“The analysis of a defendant’s 
rights under those statutes, therefore, ‘is substantially the same as [an] analysis of [the 
defendant’s] rights under the search and seizure provisions of the Oregon and Federal 
constitutions.’” (alteration in original) (citing State v. Kennedy, 290 Or. 493, 496–97, 624 
P.2d 99, 101 (1981), invalidated on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or. 7, 115 P.3d 
908 (2005))); State v. Warner, 284 Or. 147, 164, 585 P.2d 681, 690 (“In other words, the 
statutes are an attempted restatement of the rule of Terry v. Ohio . . . .”). 
110 “A routine traffic stop to investigate a traffic violation is not a criminal investigatory 
stop; rather, it is a seizure to enforce a civil, administrative motor vehicle code provision.”  
Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 26–27, State v. Kirkeby, 220 Or. App. 177, 185 P.3d 
510 (2008) (S056237); see also State v. Anderson, 304 Or. 139, 141, 743 P.2d 715, 715–
16 (1987) (observing that the legislature may authorize an administrative search unless 
criminal sanctions are the intended consequences of the search). 
111 State v. Carter, 34 Or. App. 21, 32, 578 P.2d 790, 796 (1978). 
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opinion muddles the distinction between the purposes of a traffic stop 
and a criminal stop. 
3.  Revisiting the Amaya Court’s Treatment of Federal Case Law 
Ultimately, the Amaya court chose to side with the rationale of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit––that is, officer 
questioning that is unrelated to the traffic stop does not itself amount 
to a Fourth Amendment seizure.112  The Amaya court reasoned that it 
could take its pick between diverging federal circuit court opinions 
because of a perceived lack of binding U.S. Supreme Court precedent. 
However, was the law truly devoid of any binding precedent 
concerning a subject matter limitation on traffic stops at the time of 
the Amaya opinion? 
In 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Terry,113 and it has not 
overturned or abrogated that decision since.  In Terry, an officer 
observed two men, Terry and Chilton, involved in suspicious activity 
outside of a downtown store.114  Fearing the men might be armed, the 
officer directly confronted them and requested their names.115  The 
men “mumbled something” in reply116 and, in response, the officer 
grabbed Terry and patted him down for weapons.117  The officer’s 
search revealed a revolver in Terry’s overcoat.118  The defendants in 
Terry were formally charged with carrying concealed weapons and 
moved to suppress evidence of the guns at trial.119  The trial court 
denied the motion to suppress because the officer, the court found, 
had a reasonable suspicion that the defendants’ conduct warranted 
some sort of interrogation.120  The court reasoned that the officer had 
a right to pat the men down for his own protection.121  On a grant of 
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the officer’s seizure 
and search were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
 
112 State v. Amaya, 176 Or. App. 35, 47, 20 P.3d 1177, 1183 (2001). 
113 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1986). 
114 Id. at 5–6.  After observing the men repeatedly scout out a store through its front 
window, the officer believed that the men were planning to rob the store.  Id. at 6. 
115 Id. at 6–7. 
116 Id. at 7. 
117 Id. 
118 Id.  The officer also searched Chilton and Katz and found another revolver on 
Chilton but no weapons on Katz.  Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 8. 
121 Id. 
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Constitution and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ 
motion to suppress.122 
The Terry decision stands for a number of important legal concepts 
concerning the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment search or 
seizure.  For one, a determination of the reasonableness of a search or 
seizure requires a two-pronged inquiry: (1) was the search or seizure 
reasonable at its inception; and (2) was the search or seizure 
“reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place?”123 
In Florida v. Royer,124 the U.S. Supreme Court elaborated on the 
Terry holding by clarifying that the permissible scope of an 
investigatory stop depends on the length of the detention as well as 
the types of questioning and investigating that occur during the stop.  
“[A]n investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer 
than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.  Similarly, the 
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means 
reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a 
short period of time.”125 
Returning to the Amaya decision, why did that court seemingly 
ignore binding U.S. Supreme Court case law like Terry and its 
progeny that imposed a subject matter limitation on officer 
questioning absent some reasonable suspicion of criminal activity?  
The Amaya court’s rejection of Evans was an implicit rejection of 
Terry and its two-pronged test for determining the reasonableness of a 
search or seizure.  After all, the Evans court’s analysis was entirely 
 
122 Id. at 30–31.  Before reaching this conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court first analyzed 
whether the officer’s stop and frisk of the Terry defendants amounted to “seizures” and 
“searches,” respectively, under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  The 
Court held that a “seizure” occurs under the Fourth Amendment any time law enforcement 
“accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away.”  Id. at 16.  Additionally, 
the Court held that a police frisk of a citizen amounts to a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 16–17. 
123 Id. at 19–20.  The first prong of the Terry analysis is often referred to as the 
reasonable suspicion test.  See LaFave, supra note 107, at 1862 (“The first Terry prong, of 
course, has to do with whether the stop was made on reasonable suspicion.”); see also 
Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death of 
Terry v. Ohio, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 145, 149 (1996) (“The first prong has evolved into a 
well-entrenched reasonable suspicion requirement.”).  Under the reasonable suspicion test, 
the Terry Court’s key inquiry was whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment 
of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action 
taken was appropriate.”  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22 (internal quotation omitted). 
124 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
125 Id. at 500 (citation omitted). 
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based on its application of Terry and the Fourth Amendment.126  The 
Amaya court considered Evans to be inapplicable to its analysis 
because “Evans had nothing to do with the scope of a police inquiry 
during a traffic stop.”127  Yet, Berkemer v. McCarty, a U.S. Supreme 
Court case decided before the Amaya decision, observed that “the 
usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called ‘Terry stop’ . . . 
than to a formal arrest.”128  Thus, the Amaya court was wrong to 
dismiss the applicability of Evans in its analysis of a subject matter 
limitation in the U.S. Constitution just because Evans dealt with a 
street encounter instead of a traffic stop.  Because traffic stops are 
akin to Terry stops, the temporal and subject matter limitations that 
apply to non-vehicular investigatory stops, as in Terry, would 
therefore apply with equal vigor to traffic stops. 
4.  Problems in Applying the Amaya Standard 
The Amaya court read Toevs to mean that officer questioning 
during a valid traffic stop does not require reasonable suspicion 
because the inquiries themselves do not amount to detention, and 
therefore do not implicate article I, section 9 of the Oregon 
Constitution.  Put differently, the Amaya court believed officer 
questioning during a routine traffic stop was functionally equivalent 
to “mere conversation” in non-traffic investigatory stops.129  Because 
“mere conversation” itself does not amount to a detention under 
Holmes,130 the Amaya court inferred that officer questioning alone 
does not trigger article I, section 9 protections.131  However, is officer 
questioning during a traffic stop truly indistinct from mere 
conversation during a street encounter, as the Amaya court 
 
126 See generally State v. Evans, 16 Or. App. 189, 517 P.2d 1225 (1974). 
127 State v. Amaya, 176 Or. App. 35, 42, 29 P.3d 1177, 1180 (2001). 
128 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); see also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 
U.S. 113, 117 (1998) (noting that a traffic stop is more like a Terry encounter than an 
arrest and any additional intrusions into the driver’s or passenger’s search and seizure 
rights must be independently justified); LaFave, supra note 107, at 1862 (“In lower-court 
cases involving . . . the Fourth Amendment question of what temporal and scope 
limitations apply during a traffic stop, that characterization from Berkemer has often been 
quoted with apparent approval.”).  LaFave then cites to lower-court decisions such as 
United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 2001), and People v. Gonzalez, 
789 N.E.2d 260 (Ill. 2003), that support the notion that traffic stops are akin to Terry stops. 
129 Amaya, 176 Or. App. at 42–43, 29 P.3d at 1181. 
130 See State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 407, 813 P.2d 28, 32 (1991) (“[P]olice-citizen 
encounter without any restraint of liberty (e.g. mere conversation, a non-coercive 
encounter) is not a ‘seizure . . . .’”). 
131 Amaya, 176 Or. at 44, 29 P.3d at 1181. 
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concluded?  Contrary to the Amaya court’s assertion, the terms “mere 
conversation” and “seizure” describe two exclusive concepts.132  On 
one hand, “mere conversation” occurs only between an officer and a 
person who is not seized––”that is, a person who is free to end the 
interaction and walk away from the officer.”133  On the other hand, a 
traffic stop is a seizure for constitutional purposes because a stopped 
motorist is compelled to interact with the officer and is not free to 
leave the encounter without the officer’s assent.134  Therefore, officer 
questioning itself during a traffic stop is not mere conversation 
because the questioning occurs during a seizure—the traffic stop. 
Further, when an officer poses unrelated questions during a routine 
traffic stop, the questioning morphs the routine traffic stop into a 
broader criminal investigation.  But according to the Amaya court, the 
questioning itself does not amount to a separate seizure and therefore 
does not trigger Oregon constitutional protections.  Why does the 
questioning itself amount to a new seizure to trigger those 
protections?  Consider the hypothetical from before, except in this 
version the officer asks to search the motorist’s house instead of the 
backpack.135  Under the Amaya standard, the traffic stop ended when 
the officer gave the motorist the citation for the defective license plate 
light.  However, it is unclear under Amaya whether the officer’s 
request to search the home occurred before or after the completion of 
the traffic stop.  Thus, the Amaya standard is problematic because it 
fails to account for baseless officer questioning that does not delay the 
duration of the traffic stop. 
Additionally, the Amaya standard does not help to determine the 
lawfulness of the officer’s requests to search the driver’s home 
because the standard does not take into account the intensity of the 
officer questioning.  Assuming that the officer never developed a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the driver’s house, the 
officer’s request to search the house seems incredibly unreasonable, 
in addition to being well outside the scope of the traffic stop. 
 
132 See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 2, State v. Kirkeby, 220 Or. App. 177, 185 
P.3d 510 (2008) (S056237). 
133 Id. 
134 Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 811.535 (“(1) A person commits the offense of 
failing to obey a police officer if the person refuses or fails to comply with any unlawful 
order, signal, or direction of a police officer who: (a) Is displaying the police officer’s star 
or badge; and (b) Has lawful authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.”). 
135 See hypothetical supra pp. 2–3. 
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Lastly, the Amaya Court declined to address the defendant’s 
argument that the officer had seized her without a reasonable 
suspicion by questioning her about the purse prior to searching it.  
The court concluded that even if the officer had seized the defendant, 
the seizure was justified by concern for officer safety.136  However, 
Rodgers II and Gomes, cases where the concern for officer safety 
were not at issue as in Amaya, cite to the Amaya opinion for the 
proposition that officer questioning alone is not a per se seizure.  
Because the Amaya court carved out a standard based on the need for 
ensuring officer safety, one doubts whether the Amaya standard is 
even applicable to Rodgers II and Gomes.  Further, the omission of 
any meaningful article I, section 9 seizure analysis in the Amaya 
opinion sets a confusing precedent.  The confusion manifests in the 
Gomes opinion, when the court ignores the bright-line test from 
Holmes for determining whether a seizure occurred under article I, 
section 9.137  In sum, the broad application of the narrow Amaya 
standard to intrusive officer inquiries seems misplaced when 
considering that the officer inquiries in Amaya were posed in order to 
ensure officer and public safety. 
B.  Understanding the Gomes Opinion in Light of State v. Amaya and 
State v. Rodgers/Kirkeby 
In State v. Gomes, the Oregon Court of Appeals interpreted State v. 
Amaya and State v. Rodgers II to mean that article I, section 9 
imposes only a temporal limitation on the duration of a traffic stop.138  
Below, this Comment focuses on the Gomes court’s consideration of 
the Rodgers II opinion and ultimately explains how the Gomes 
opinion’s rejection of a constitutionally recognized subject matter 
limitation is in line with the current trend in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
136 Amaya, 176 Or. App. at 38, 29 P.3d at 1178. 
137 [A] “seizure” of a person occurs under [a]rticle I, section 9, of the Oregon 
Constitution (a) if a law enforcement officer intentionally and significantly 
restricts, interferes with, or otherwise deprives an individual of that individual’s 
liberty or freedom of movement; or (b) whenever an individual believes that (a), 
above, has occurred and such belief is  objectively reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
State v. Holmes, 311 Or. 400, 409, 813 P.2d 28, 34 (1991). 
138 State v. Gomes, 236 Or. App. 364, 371, 236 P.3d 841, 845 (2010) (“We take that 
language to confirm our Rodgers opinion and our opinion in State v. Amaya . . . that there 
are no [a]rticle I, section 9, implications if an inquiry unrelated to the traffic stop occurs 
during a routine stop but does not delay it.”). 
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To begin, the Gomes court construed the Rodgers II opinion to 
mean that, although officer questioning combined with a show of 
authority may result in a constitutional seizure, that seizure is 
unlawful only if it occurs after the completion of the investigation of 
the traffic violation and without a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.  In other words, Gomes establishes that law enforcement can 
inquire, without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, into 
any matter during a routine traffic stop so long as the questions do not 
unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop. 
Looking back to cases such as Carter, one can appreciate the major 
change in Oregon traffic-stop law ushered in by Gomes.  As 
mentioned before, much of that change can be attributed to the 
enactment of Oregon’s exclusionary rule and emerging federal circuit 
case law.139  On the other hand, the apparent validity of Terry, and its 
dual-pronged test for determining the reasonableness of a seizure and 
search, still suggests that law enforcement conduct during traffic stops 
must be tailored to the scope of the circumstances that justified the 
initial interference, unless it is otherwise supported by reasonable 
suspicion.  Although Gomes appears somewhat at odds with the Terry 
holding, modern U.S. Supreme Court case law has signaled the death 
of Terry.140  Further, the Gomes opinion echoes the modern trend in 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions rejecting the notion that the federal 
Constitution supports a subject matter limitation on traffic stops. 
C.  Arizona v. Johnson: The Supreme Court’s Current Position on 
Fourth Amendment Restrictions to Law Enforcement Conduct 
In Arizona v. Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an 
officer’s questioning of a passenger during a lawful traffic stop 
amounted to reasonable conduct under the Fourth Amendment despite 
the irrelevance of the questioning to the justification for the stop.141  
The defendant was a passenger in a car pulled over for a vehicle 
registration violation.142  While one officer obtained the driver’s 
 
139 See supra Part III (discussing the effect of Oregon’s statutory exclusionary rule on a 
subject matter limitation prescribed by statute); Part IV.A.2 (discussing the Amaya court’s 
observation of the federal circuit split concerning a subject matter limitation under the U.S. 
Constitution). 
140 See Levit, supra note 123, at 146 (suggesting that the outcome of U.S. v. Whren, 517 
U.S. 806 (1996), also signaled the death of Terry). 
141 555 U.S. 323, 333–34 (2009). 
142 Id. at 327. 
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information, another officer approached the defendant and asked him 
questions about his gang activity.143  Based on the defendant’s 
answers while seated in the car, the officer suspected that the 
defendant might be armed and asked him to get out of the car.144  
When the defendant exited the car, the officer patted him down for 
officer safety and uncovered a gun from the defendant’s waistband.145  
The defendant was arrested, charged with possession of a weapon by 
a prohibited possessor, and moved to suppress the evidence at trial as 
the result of an unlawful search.146 
The Johnson Court disagreed with the Arizona Court of Appeals 
opinion that, prior to the frisk, the detention had transformed into a 
separate encounter stemming from an unrelated investigation of the 
defendant’s possible gang affiliation.147  The Johnson Court 
apparently abolished the rule in Terry that law enforcement conduct 
must be reasonably related in scope to the justification for the 
intrusion.148  Instead, the Court recognized only a temporal limitation 
on the duration of the police interference: “[a]n officer’s inquiries into 
matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop, this Court has 
made plain, do not convert the encounter into something other than a 
lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend 
the duration of the stop.”149 
VI 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF MODERN OREGON AND FEDERAL CASE LAW 
ON OREGON STATUTORY LAW 
After the enactment of ORS 136.432, Oregon courts stopped 
looking to statutes and started analyzing the Oregon Constitution to 
determine whether there was a subject matter limitation on 
questioning during a traffic stop.  Yet, modern Oregon case law fails 
to extrapolate a subject matter limitation from the Oregon 
 
143 Id. at 328.  The officer asked these questions after observing the defendant’s blue 
bandana, which the officer considered identification of Crips gang membership, and a 
police scanner visible in the defendant’s pocket, which the officer considered to be a 
possible indication that the defendant was involved in criminal activity.  Id.  Both 





148 Id. at 333. 
149 Id. (citation omitted). 
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Constitution.  Further, the U.S. Supreme Court in Johnson 
unequivocally announced that the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution does not recognize a subject matter limitation on traffic 
stops.  However, ORS 131.615 and ORS 810.410 currently impose a 
subject matter restriction on officer questioning during traffic 
stops.150  Do these laws still serve some function in light of the 
enactment of ORS 136.432?  Or have these statutes been emasculated 
to such an extent that they no longer serve their original purpose? 
A.  Perspective 1: The Subject Matter Limitation Statutes Are Meant 
to Remain Current Law 
Despite the deterioration of the subject matter limitation 
statutes,151 they were meant to stand as current law.  Through 
legislation, Oregon citizens collectively voiced their expectation that 
peace officers, when lacking reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
should conduct themselves in a manner relevant to the primary 
purpose of the traffic stop: investigating a traffic violation. 
Most citizens acquiesce to an implied social contract with law 
enforcement to cooperate during traffic stops.  Such cooperation 
stems in part from the respect that citizens generally have toward law 
enforcement.  The average citizen understands that he or she is not 
free to leave in the middle of a traffic stop, and that certain 
information must be surrendered to officers to assist their 
investigation.  When officers limit themselves to asking pertinent 
questions concerning the traffic stop, their intentions are obvious and 
understandable to the driver.  By respecting the scope of the traffic-
related reason for the stop, law enforcement symbolically confirms its 
mutual respect for and acknowledgment of this social contract.  Thus, 
the statutes pertaining to subject matter limitation enforce the social 
contract between officers and citizens by promising specific 
restrictions on officer conduct during traffic stops. 
But how do those statutes actually deter officer misconduct?  After 
all, neither statute expressly articulates a remedy for a violation, and 
further, ORS 136.432 specifically disallows the suppression of 
evidence as recourse for violations of those statutes.  As the statutes 
currently stand, they promise certain rights to citizens without 
defining any remedy for the deprivation of those rights. 
 
150 See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 131.615(1)–(3)(b), 810.410 (2011). 
151 Id. §§ 131.615, 810.410. 
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B.  Perspective 2: ORS 131.615 and 810.410 Should Be Amended to 
Reflect the Current State of Oregon Law 
From a different perspective, the coupling of modern case law and 
the enactment of ORS 136.432 express a clear judicial and legislative 
intent to do away with a statutorily mandated subject matter limitation 
on traffic stops.  Through legislation, Oregonians have shown that 
they value the police’s ability to conduct their investigative function 
without worrying about procedural technicalities.  During a traffic 
stop, society wants to empower law enforcement to lawfully be able 
to seize a person and search his or her automobile for weapons in 
order to ensure officer and public safety.  In addition, Oregon wants 
to do its part to fight the war on drugs, a war that frequently takes 
place on Oregon highways.  Appropriately, citizens of Oregon grant 
police the freedom to investigate crime through traffic-stop inquiries 
to make certain that public roads are not being used as conduits for 
drug trafficking. 
Accordingly, the subject matter limitation statutes should be 
repealed.  After all, neither the Oregon state nor the federal courts 
recognize such a subject matter limitation, so leaving the statutes as 
they are misstates the true law of the land and confuses Oregonians, 
officers, and citizens alike. 
C.  Perspective 3: ORS 131.615 and 810.410 Should Be Amended to 
Protect Motorists from Intrusive Officer Conduct 
Due to the legislative purpose and history of case law behind the 
subject matter limitation statutes, the Oregon State Legislature ought 
to amend these statutes to include evidentiary suppression as a viable 
remedy for peace officer violations.  In State v. Thompson-Seed, the 
court explained that Oregon legislators likely intended ORS 136.432 
to address only the exclusion of evidence required by judicial ruling, 
not to repeal current laws.152  “[I]t is well settled that... repeals by 
implication are not favored by the courts” because existing statutes 
reflect the popular will of the people.153  Therefore, amending ORS 
131.615 and ORS 810.410 to expressly include evidence suppression 
as a possible remedy restores the intended effect of the statutes––law 
 
152 162 Or. App. 483, 488, 986 P.2d 732, 736 (1999). 
153 Id. at 491, 986 P.2d at 736 (quoting State ex rel. Med. Pear Co. v. Fowler, 207 Or. 
182, 195, 295 P.2d 167, 173 (1956)). 
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enforcement deterrence.154  Such an amendment also would restore 
some judicial authority in analyzing the reasonableness of law 
enforcement conduct during traffic stops.  Although ORS 136.432 
seeks to eliminate wholesale judicial determinations of evidence 
suppression,155 Oregon courts have historically encouraged at least 
some judicial input when deciding suppression issues.  “Statutes 
should . . . ‘be so phrased as to leave a certain amount of judicial 
elbow room for the exercise of discretion.’”156 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has examined nearly forty years of Oregon state 
and statutory law to answer the question posed from the start: Is there 
a subject matter limitation on officer inquiries during routine traffic 
stops in Oregon?  Twenty years ago, the answer would have been 
“yes,” based on case law, such as State v. Evans and State v. Carter, 
and its application of ORS 131.615 and 810.410.  However, the 
enactment of ORS 136.432, in addition to subsequent case law such 
as State v. Amaya and State v. Gomes, has collectively answered “no” 
to whether Oregon law recognizes a subject matter limitation.  In 
sum, Oregon law does not recognize a subject matter limitation to 
officer inquiries that are unrelated to the traffic reason for the stop––
for the time being. 
∼ 
The difficulty springs from the inherent tension between our 
commitment to safeguarding the precious, and all too fragile, right to 
go about one’s business free from unwarranted government 
interference, and our recognition that the police must be allowed 
some latitude in gathering information from those individuals who 
are willing to cooperate.  Given these difficulties, it is perhaps 
 
154 To clarify, violations of either ORS 131.615 or ORS 810.410 would not 
automatically trigger evidence suppression.  As was the case before the enactment of ORS 
136.432, Oregon courts have repeatedly stated that the “[v]iolation of a law by law 
enforcement personnel does not necessarily require suppression.”  State v. Trenary, 316 
Or. 172, 176, 850 P.2d 356, 358 (1993). 
155 See Thompson-Seed, 162 Or. App. at 488, 986 P.2d at 734 (noting that the language 
of ORS 136.432 is consistent with the intention to focus more narrowly on court-created 
rules of exclusion). 
156 State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 835, 841, 618 P.3d 423, 426 (1980). 
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understandable that our efforts to strike an appropriate balance have 
not produced uniform results.157 
  – Justice Brennan 
 
 
157 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 226 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
